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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

10 JUNE 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

10 June 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 23)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 JUNE 1970

<u>Moscow (3771 items)</u>			<u>Peking (3077 items)</u>		
Indochina	(10%)	10%	Indochina	(82%)	51%
[Vietnam	(1%)	5%]	[Cambodia	(33%)	19%]
[Cambodia	(5%)	3%]	[Mao Statement	(42%)	18%]
Upcoming Supreme	(4%)	10%	[Vietnam	(3%)	10%]
Soviet			Domestic Issues	(8%)	25%
Elections			Hoxha Speeches,	(1%)	10%
Soyuz 9 Launch	(--)	9%	Tour of		
International	(--)	9%	North		
Communist			Albania		
Party Meeting			Pakistani Air	(0.2%)	6%
in Moscow, 1st			Marshal Abdul		
Anniversary			Rahim Khan in		
International	(3%)	7%	PRC		
Youth Forum					
on Lenin					
Anniversary					
China	(7%)	6%			
Gromyko in France	(0.1%)	4%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 3 June TV speech in which he reported on the U.S. operation in Cambodia and confirmed that U.S. withdrawal would be completed by 30 June prompts predictably derisive reaction. Ridicule of the President's claims of success includes that by President Huynh Tan Phat in his speech at a meeting marking the 6 June first anniversary of the establishment of the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG).

The U.S. operation in Cambodia is also condemned at the regular, sixth session of the DRV National Assembly, which Hanoi media on the 6th revealed had met and reviewed internal and foreign affairs. The Council of Ministers' political report read by Premier Pham Van Dong claims that "failure" of the U.S. Vietnamization policy prompted the President to carry out a "massive" invasion of Cambodia--a "senseless adventure condemned by U.S. and world public opinion."

Publicity for Sihanouk's official visit to the DRV (25 May-8 June) includes the release of a joint communique which stresses unity and reiterates that the "brilliant success" of the Indochinese summit conference in April marked a new and important development in the struggle of the Vietnamese, Lao, and Khmer peoples.

Moscow comment on the President's speech claims that he tried to deceive public opinion by "pretending" that the intervention of U.S. troops into Cambodia was successful. And Kosygin in his 10 June election speech, as summarized by TASS, repeats that the Soviet position on U.S. "aggression" in Southeast Asia is a "principled and consistent one" and that the only way to solve the Indochina problem is by withdrawing U.S. and allied troops from Vietnam and "other countries in the area."

Moscow's continuing attacks on Peking policies are highlighted by a NEW TIMES article by M. Ukraintsev which charges that Chinese interference in Cambodia "prompted the rightwing forces to stage a coup and seek American support."

Peking's declining but still substantial volume of attention to Indochina includes continuing publicity for Mao's 20 May statement of support for the "revolution." And an 8 June PEOPLE'S DAILY commentator article says President Nixon's speech reflects the predicament which Mao outlined--the U.S. Government is "beset with troubles internally and externally, with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad."

## PRESIDENT NIXON'S 3 JUNE TV ADDRESS ON CAMBODIA SCORED

Hanoi and Liberation Front reaction to the President's speech comes promptly with radio commentaries on the 4th and articles in the press on the 5th. A 10 June Hanoi article says that the DRV media early on the 4th

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sets the stage for subsequent propaganda in saying that President Nixon "climaxed his art of lying" when he said that the Cambodian operations have been "the most successful in this long and difficult war." There is some inconsistency in descriptions of the nature of the operation. The English-language broadcast and one in the domestic service on the same day ridicule the President's claims regarding capture of weapons but obscure the fact that the weapons were Vietnamese communist. On the other hand, a Hanoi broadcast beamed to South Vietnam cites the President's remark that the equipment captured in Cambodia equaled that captured in South Vietnam throughout 1969. And it asks how the Viet Cong shellings increased in South Vietnam during May if so many weapons had been lost.

The broadcast beamed to the South and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 5th, broadcast in the domestic service, also chide the President for failing to mention his main objective--"the razing of 'Viet Cong' headquarters." And the paper says that "as pointed out by the U.S. press," the Viet Cong general headquarters is a figment of the United States' imagination. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN says the President's claim of success in razing enemy equipment is a "cunning maneuver" which was laid bare "while in preparation" by former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford when, in his LIFE magazine article, he predicted there would be such reports of successes in the Cambodian operations.

Taking a different tack, a NHAN DAN article, as reviewed by VNA on the 5th, says that President Nixon had in mind several main objectives for the Cambodian operations, but claims the main one was to "save the Lon Nol-Matak clique from imminent collapse." Typically ignoring the role of the Vietnamese communists, NHAN DAN says that U.S. and Saigon troops have come up against "firm resistance from the liberation forces and people of Cambodia," and that these forces have put "tens of thousands" out of action. The paper goes on to say that the U.S. and Saigon troops in Cambodia also attacked the "liberated areas" of South Vietnam near the border, hoping that they could relieve the pressure on the "aggressors" in South Vietnam.

Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN note the frequency of the President's statements on Indochina in recent weeks, and the army paper gives particular stress to antiwar sentiment in the United States. Several of the commentaries note the President's "threat" to take strong measures if American lives continue to be jeopardized, with QUAN DOI NHAN DAN saying that this is the 18th time he has voiced such a threat since his inauguration.

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The President's announcement that 50,000 troops--of the 150,000 that will be withdrawn by May 1971--will be out of South Vietnam by 15 October is ignored by the press articles. But the announcement is noted, and ridiculed, in some of the radio comment. And PRG President Phat in his anniversary speech says that this withdrawal, like the promised withdrawal from Cambodia by 30 June, should be seen against the background of the President's reserving the right to again use U.S. forces "in coordination with Saigon puppet troops" in Cambodia.

SIHANOUK STATEMENT VNA on the 5th releases the text of a statement issued by Prince Sihanouk which says that "Mr. Nixon was making fun of the world when he spoke of a violation of Khmer neutrality by the army of the National United Front of Kampuchea" (FUNK). In reply to President Nixon's statement that "between 20 and 30 April communist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia . . . in flagrant violation of Cambodian neutrality," the Prince asserts that the "national liberation army led by the FUNK has every right to attack" the forces of the Lon Nol regime. Sihanouk also claims that the pretext of attacking "'Viet Cong sanctuaries'" does not "hold water" and he quotes Senator Fulbright as saying that the purpose of the Cambodian operations was not to eliminate the communist border sanctuaries but to sustain the Lon Nol military regime.

Distorting the President's warning to the North Vietnamese that if they increase their attacks on remaining American personnel in Vietnam, strong and effective measures will be taken, Sihanouk says that Mr. Nixon has "threatened our people with the worst military retaliations if they will not let the Lon Nol regime alone after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia next July."

And in a "postscript" to his statement, Sihanouk says that "at least 90 percent" of the number of "so-called" enemy forces killed in Cambodia were "poor Khmer peasants and city-dwellers including old people, women, and children killed under the bombs of B-52's." As for the claims of captured enemy equipment, the Prince adds that they are "ridiculous," and proof of this is the fact that NFLSV forces recently dealt "violent blows at hundreds of posts and dozens of urban centers including Dalat."

MOSCOW Soviet propaganda on the President's speech says that he tried to deceive public opinion by "pretending" that the intervention was successful and that it would reduce the scale of the Vietnam war. Commentators do not refer to the Vietnamese

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communist presence in Cambodia in ridiculing the President's assertion that the intervention was necessary to save American lives and speed up Vietnamization. And a 4 June foreign-language commentary even says that the films the President showed were of "war trophies of unknown origin."

Commentators denigrate the President's promise to withdraw troops from Cambodia by 30 June, and a broadcast in English to the United Kingdom on 4 June notes his warning that "hostilities will be resumed if the situation demands it," saying that he thus reserved the right to send troops into Cambodia at his own discretion. In saying that U.S. air action in Cambodia will continue, Moscow commentators obscure the President's assertion that these would be missions to interdict the movement of enemy troops and materiel which would threaten the security of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Thus, the broadcast to the United Kingdom says the air strikes would be for reconnaissance and in support of combat operations. And it juxtaposes to this the assertion that the President indicated that Saigon forces would remain in Cambodia. Participants in the domestic service roundtable on the 7th acknowledge that the President said that 50,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 15 October, but they add that the American command subsequently said that they knew of no withdrawals "in the near future."

A 4 June TASS report says that the President was "forced to admit" that U.S. intervention in Cambodia met an "unprecedented barrage" of criticism at home and that it was probably with this in mind that he said that "the door to a negotiated peace remains wide open." At the same time, says TASS, he reiterated his "usual threats" against the Vietnamese patriots. A 5 June IZVESTIYA article, also commenting on the President's "admission" of a split in opinion at home, says that the Senate debate on the Cooper-Church amendment is proof of dissension.

PEKING      The PRC's first reaction to the President's speech comes on 6 June, in an NCNA report of the PRG ambassador's reception in Peking on the PRG anniversary. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien is quoted as saying that the speech was "fraught with sophistry, deception, and threats," and a revelation of the President's "counterrevolutionary dual tactics," but he did not mention any of the substance of the President's remarks. Earlier in his speech, Li denounced U.S. policy in Asia and scored the "political deception" of plotting "international conferences under various names."

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A 7 June NCNA commentary notes that the President while praising the success of the operation "admitted" that his decision on the invasion of Cambodia received an "unprecedented barrage of criticism" at home. Charging that the President "fabricated" these successes, NCNA says that even U.S. politicians and press admit that Vietnamization is a "hoax," that U.S. losses have already been costly in Cambodia, and that the President's "statistics" on the operation are "unreliable." NCNA ridicules the President's promise to withdraw troops from Cambodia by 30 June and his announcement that 50,000 troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 15 October. Noting that he reiterated his 30 April warning of possible future "strong and effective measures," NCNA adds that the President said that "bombing" of Cambodia will continue even after withdrawal of U.S. troops and that Saigon troops will remain.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary, carried by NCNA on the 8th, recalls that Mao, in his 20 May statement, said that "the Nixon Government is beset with troubles internally and externally, with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad," and it says that the President's speech reflects this predicament. Nixon's arguments to "justify" the aggression in Cambodia can be summed up in his assertion that it is necessary to save American lives, says PEOPLE'S DAILY. Although it says that he fabricates "rumors and lies," it does not mention the issue of Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

#### PARIS SESSION: COMMUNIST MEDIA AGAIN GLOSS OVER DETAILS

The VNA and LPA accounts of the 69th session of the Paris talks on 4 June note that PRG deputy delegation head Nguyen Van Tien recalled the first anniversary of the establishment of the PRG and its adoption of the NFLSV's "correct" 10-point solution. However, like last week, VNA offers only a sparse account of the communist statements. It fails to mention that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy also referred to the PRG's anniversary and that he pointed out that last year's "new factors"--the appearance of the PRG, the naming of Mme. Binh as its foreign minister and chief of its Paris delegation, and the PRG's adoption of the NFLSV 10-point solution--would have lead to the Vietnam problem being appropriately settled "long ago" had the United States really been interested in settling the war.

Glossing over the details of PRG delegate Tien's remarks, VNA notes that he condemned the United States for obstinately opposing the legitimate South Vietnamese demands, for widening the war to

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all of Indochina, and for downgrading the Paris conference. The account also says that he accused President Nixon of making preparations for a "long occupation" of Cambodia through U.S.-aided and -supported GVN forces and Thai mercenaries, after having been forced by public pressure and condemnation to pledge a complete U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia.

VNA also glosses over much of DRV delegate Vy's remarks including those on Cambodia. The account reports his dismissal of the Nixon Administration's "boasts" of "sham victories" in Cambodia which, he says, cannot deceive U.S. and world public opinion. VNA does not report in this regard that Vy again cited for the third consecutive week former Defense Secretary Clifford's LIFE magazine article to buttress his argument that the Cambodian operations were a sign of bankruptcy for the Vietnamization program. Vy quoted Clifford as saying, among other things, that the Cambodian moves will delay U.S. withdrawals from South Vietnam, lengthen the war, and increase American casualties.

The VNA account of the allied delegates' statements is typical when it says that GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong "repeated the hackneyed proposal on 'mutual withdrawal' and 'free elections' to be organized by the puppet regime." As for U.S. delegate Habib, VNA says he "tried to justify the U.S. aggression in Cambodia, stubbornly demanded mutual withdrawal from South Vietnam, and repeated President Nixon's threats in his 3 June 1970 speech."

#### HANOI MEDIA REPORT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

In addition to reportage on military action in Cambodia, NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 8th carry editorials hailing the victories achieved by the "Cambodian people's liberation armed forces" during the month of May. NHAN DAN says the "victories" amount to a great turning point in Cambodian history and "a big leap forward in the Cambodian revolution." VNA on the 8th cites the FUNK's Information Bureau in claiming that 22,000 Lon Nol regime troops were put out of action, along with 12,000 U.S. and Saigon troops.

Hanoi sees reports of increased Thai military assistance to Lon Nol as evidence that Nixon's doctrine of "using Asians to fight Asians" is being implemented. Available Vietnamese communist comment does not discuss GVN Vice President Ky's current official visit to Phnom Penh, although his "secret" trip to Phnom Penh last month prompted a 9 May NHAN DAN comment that it was for the

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purpose of discussing with Lon Nol "further repressive plans against the Khmer people and Vietnamese residents." (A Moscow broadcast in English to South Asia on 4 June says that Ky went to Phnom Penh to discuss the presence of some 50,000 South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Criticizing the Phnom Penh authorities for cooperating with Saigon, the commentary warns that Ky has always been "hostile" toward Cambodia, and asserts that before he left Saigon he "demanded special powers that would virtually make him the ruler of the occupied Cambodian territory.")

"DEFENSE MINISTER"  
MESSAGE TO SIHANOUK

VNA on the 10th reports a message to Prince Sihanouk, dated 25 May, from Khieu Samphan, defense minister in Sihanouk's government, reporting on developments in Cambodia. The message says among other things that a "command of the Cambodian National Liberation Army has been temporarily set up in the liberated area for the organization, training, equipping, and political and cultural education of the forces."\* The message also reveals that "preparations are under way for a Cambodian national liberation radio," and it reports that FUNK information bureaus have been established in the "liberated areas."

SIHANOUK CONCLUDES VISIT TO DRV, RETURNS TO PEKING

The departure of Prince Sihanouk and his entourage from Hanoi for Peking on the 8th, after his two-week state visit, occasions effusive tributes by both sides. Speaking at his departure ceremony, as reported by VNA on the 8th, Sihanouk notes that the two sides "had very important and cordial political conversations and working meetings with the highest national leaders of the DRV." (The DRV delegation, according to the joint DRV-Sihanouk communique, included, among others, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh.) Sihanouk adds in his farewell speech that "no problem, no dispute exists between our two countries and states. Nothing divides us. Everything unites." The Prince reaffirms that the Cambodian people, "strong with the unreserved backing, full support, and unconditional material assistance" which the DRV has provided, will together with the Vietnamese and Lao peoples succeed in driving out the "U.S. enemy" from Indochina.

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\* On 18 May, NCNA had reported a 10 May message to Sihanouk from the defense minister and the two other cabinet members said to be in Cambodia. On 11 May VNA had carried a statement dated the 3d attributed to the army's command. See the TRENDS of 20 May, pages 3-4, and of 13 May, pages 11-12.

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The highlight of Sihanouk's last few days in Hanoi was the Prince's hosting a "grand farewell banquet" on the evening of the 7th in honor of DRV President Ton Duc Thang. According to the VNA report of the 7th, those attending the banquet included Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Xuan Thuy and others. The chief speakers at the banquet were Thang and Sihanouk.

The joint Sihanouk-Ton Duc Thang communique, dated the 7th and released on the 8th, is replete with mutual endorsements of the respective struggles of the Vietnamese, Khmer, and Lao peoples against the United States and its "lackeys." In addition to the stock denunciations of U.S. imperialism and neocolonialism in Indochina and reaffirmations of the "militant solidarity" of the Indochinese peoples, the DRV pledges in the joint communique "to support wholeheartedly the just struggle of the brother Khmer people . . . until total victory." It says further that the DRV once again "solemnly declares that it scrupulously respects the independence, neutrality, sovereignty, and political regime of Cambodia, recognizes and commits to respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia within her existing borders." The bilateral talks were said to have been held "in a friendly, fraternal, and sincere atmosphere, and the two sides shared unanimous views on issues which have been brought up."

Both Moscow and Peking report Sihanouk's activities in Hanoi without comment. NCNA carries the texts of Sihanouk's messages to the Khmer people and to the American people, which were originally carried by VNA on 3 and 5 June, as well as his 5 June statement on President Nixon's speech and the joint communique. On 8 June NCNA reports that Chou En-lai met Sihanouk upon his arrival back in Peking. TASS briefly reports Sihanouk's message to the American people, his statement on the Nixon speech, and the joint communique.

#### ISSUE OF RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

The issue of recognition of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union was briefly raised by PRC Politburo member Kang Sheng in a 9 June banquet speech for the Romanian delegation visiting Peking. Noting that the Romanians have consistently supported the three Indochinese peoples in their struggle against U.S. imperialism, Kang Sheng recalls that Romania was one of the first countries to recognize the new Cambodian government.

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Sihanouk, in a 7 June interview with a Tokyo MAINICHI correspondent, which is not known to have been publicized by any available communist media, says that upon his return from Hanoi he will send Premier Penn Nouth to "Moscow, Paris, and other countries" to "make them understand Cambodia's royal system." He expresses the belief that the USSR, its allies, and the countries of the third world "will recognize our government in the near future. Even though it may not happen tomorrow, it will happen in the months to come."

#### MOSCOW BLAMES PRC FOR LON NOL COUP IN CAMBODIA

The Soviet attack on various aspects of Peking's Indochina policies is highlighted by a NEW TIMES article by Mikhail Ukraintsev, as carried by Moscow radio on 7 June,\* which charges Peking with causing the Cambodian coup. It recalls that in the past the Chinese tried to "stir up trouble" in Cambodia and that their interference was so provocative that Sihanouk was forced to protest and "recall for some time" the Cambodian ambassador from Peking.

In September 1967 Sihanouk announced that he would recall the Cambodian ambassador from Peking as a result of a dispute over Chinese interference in Sino-Cambodian friendship associations. A few days later, however, he said that he had cancelled the decision at the request of Chou En-lai.\*\* Ukraintsev goes on to say that "Chinese interference prompted the rightwing forces in Cambodia to stage a coup and seek American support."

The issue of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam is explicitly recalled for the first time since last September in a 6 June Mandarin-language broadcast over Moscow Radio Peace and Progress. The broadcast, pegged to the anniversary of the June 1969 Moscow conference of communist and workers parties, recalls that the conference stressed the need for unity in supporting the Vietnamese people. It also recalls that the Chinese leadership has refused to join a "united front" and has slandered the friends of the Vietnamese people, even having used "various means to obstruct the transport of Soviet military materials via Chinese territory to the DRV," and issued orders

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\* This article is discussed as a whole in the Sino-Soviet relations section of this issue of the TRENDS.

\*\* For a discussion see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 28 September 1967, pages 16-18.

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"to detain, or even to seize, those military materials." The commentary reiterates that Peking's "unprecedented anti-Soviet assault" on Lenin's centenary encouraged the United States to invade Cambodia and resume the bombing of the DRV.

#### GROMYKO IN FRANCE SUPPORTS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Soviet support for a negotiated settlement in Indochina is reiterated in the joint communique issued on the 1-5 June visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to France. It says that the two sides expressed "serious concern" over the "foreign intervention" which has expanded and protracted the conflict in Indochina, and that they asserted their "closeness of views" on the "question of settling Indochinese problems through negotiations." The communique says that the sides confirmed their desire to undertake "the necessary efforts in respect to all interested sides" to insure that the Indochinese people are guaranteed the opportunity, "under the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962," to decide their own destiny.

Paris AFP, but not Moscow media, reports that at a Paris press conference on the 5th Gromyko said that the Soviet Union "does not oppose the French suggestion that an enlarged international conference be called to deal with the war in Indochina." He added, however, that "the agreement of the directly interested parties" must be obtained.

Gromyko's reported remarks are similar to those attributed to the Polish foreign minister in Paris in a 7 May TASS report. This was one of the few Soviet references to the 1 April French proposal; TASS had carried a brief factual report at the time and later, on 10 April, reported comments on it by Le Duc Tho, DRV adviser to the Paris delegation. Kosygin, when asked about a new Geneva conference at his 4 May Moscow press conference, said that "the decisive word" on such a conference rests with the Indochinese.

#### ANNIVERSARY OF PRG ESTABLISHMENT MARKED

THE FRONT      The anniversary of the 6 June 1969 formation of the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government is officially marked by a "grand meeting" in a "liberated zone," according to a 7 June LPA report. LPA says that the meeting--held "recently"--was addressed by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, as well as representatives of the NFLSV and the Vietnam Alliance. In his speech, carried textually by the Front radio on the 8th, Phat scores

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recent U.S. actions, charging that the Nixon Administration is not reducing commitments in Asia, but instead is stepping up intervention by prolonging and spreading the war. He also attacks the Administration for going ahead with "its peace swindle," declaring that "the United States, through reactionaries in Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia . . . is campaigning for a so-called 'international conference for peace in Cambodia and Indochina.'"

Other South Vietnamese communist propaganda on the PRG anniversary reviews claims of political and military successes in the past year. Thus, for example, LPA on the 6th claims that the people's revolutionary administration has grown rapidly since the founding of the PRG and says that "revolutionary power has been set up in 44 provinces and cities, in over 150 districts, townships, or townlets, and in 1,500 villages." Other comment, including an LPA editorial on the 5th, claims revolutionary power has been established in only 42 provinces and towns. (The PRG representative at the 30 December 1969 session of the Paris talks claimed that revolutionary power had been set up in 41 provinces and towns, 150 districts, and 1,300 villages out of 1,600 in South Vietnam.) Several commentaries mention the success of land reform in liberated areas, along with other programs to benefit the people.

Alleged PRG achievements are also detailed in a 4 June press conference statement by the PRG representative in Hanoi, Truong Cong Dong, reported by VNA on the 4th and Hanoi radio on the 5th.

HANOI Hanoi greets the PRG anniversary with a message from Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Phat, which lauds southern "successes" on the battlefield and claims that the PRG's "position and prestige in the world have been constantly raised." It charges the United States with strengthening the special war in Laos, raiding populous areas in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces, and sending troops to invade Cambodia, "thus creating an extremely dangerous situation in Asia and menacing peace in this area and the world." The message maintains that the situation is very favorable for the Vietnamese and Indochinese peoples and that the Indochinese people will "certainly defeat every dark design of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen and gain greater successes."

The anniversary is also hailed in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials, and on 8 June an anniversary reception was held by Truong Cong Dong, acting head of the PRG representation in the DRV.

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MOSCOW The Soviet Union marked the PRG anniversary with a message of greetings, articles in the press, and a public meeting in Moscow; and the PRG embassy reception to mark the occasion, held on the 4th, was attended by alternate member of the CPSU Politburo Victor Grishin. The message, addressed to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin,\* scores the United States for "blocking a political settlement of the Vietnam problem" and "trying in different ways to protract the armed conflict by extending the flames of war to the whole of Indochina." The message concludes that the Soviet people condemn the U.S. actions and voice solidarity with the Vietnamese and Indochinese peoples and that "there is no doubt" that the Indochinese peoples' struggle will be victorious.

Radio commentaries and signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA claim achievements by the PRG in its socio-economic efforts as well as its military operations and note the PRG's presence at the Paris talks and recognition by many governments. Moscow radio's domestic service on the 6th carries a talk by RED STAR commentator Aleksey Leontyev who claims that the proclamation of the PRG "opened up favorable opportunities for the speediest possible peaceful settlement," but that Washington did not take advantage of the opportunities, sabotaged the Paris talks, and prepared for the "escalation of the aggression in Indochina, which we are now witnessing."

A RED STAR article on the anniversary by Leontyev on the same day does not contain this reference to missed opportunities. But it prefaces the assertion that Washington "by no means intends to fill the vacant place of delegation head at Paris" with a quotation from former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford's LIFE article. Calling Clifford a "sober voice" in U.S. ruling circles, Leontyev quotes his assertion that "we are unable to win a military victory in South Vietnam and, therefore, we must stop all our efforts in this direction . . . . I have come to the conclusion that we could not and cannot be able to win."

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\* At the time of the formation of the PRG last year, the Soviet message of congratulations and recognition was sent from Kosygin to Phat; but the PRG response came from Nguyen Huu Tho, along with Phat, and was addressed to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin.

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PEKING      The PRG anniversary is greeted in a message to Huynh Tan Phat from PRC Premier Chou En-lai\* and Chou reportedly attended a 6 June PRG embassy reception marking the occasion. The anniversary was also marked by a reception given by Chinese friendship associations, attended by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Chou's message affirms routinely that the Chinese people back the Vietnamese and that they will give them "firm support." Chou maintains that the United States is isolated and weakened in the wake of the expansion of the war and expresses conviction that the South Vietnamese, following Ho's will, will persevere in protracted war and win complete victory.

The Chinese speaker at the PRG embassy reception, Li Hsien-nien, claims that the United States is in an unprecedented impasse and that "the prospects of victory before the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos has never been so bright as it is today." Li particularly scores the planned use of Thai forces in Cambodia, warning that the action will only evoke stronger Indochinese resistance and "stimulate the development of the Thai people's revolutionary armed struggle." He charges that the United States is "stepping up political deception in a vain attempt to undermine the Indochinese people's struggle . . . by plotting international conferences under various names"; and he specifically attacks the Djakarta conference.

Speaking at the friendship associations' reception, Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, reiterates the PRC's conviction that the Indochinese peoples can win their protracted war. He says that the Chinese people "have always regarded the Vietnamese people's struggle as their own" and concludes with a promise of firm support.

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\* Chou also sent to Phat the PRC message of recognition and congratulations on the establishment of the PRG last year; but the PRG response was from Nguyen Huu Tho, as well as Phat, and was addressed to Mao and Lin Piao, along with Chou.

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## NORTH KOREA

## PYONGYANG CLAIMS INTRUSION, SINKING OF "U.S. SPY SHIP"

North Korea's alleged sinking of a "U.S. spy ship" which intruded into DPRK waters, reported by Pyongyang on 5 June, receives moderate DPRK propaganda play, but thus far there has been no authoritative comment. The initial report by the domestic service and KCNA says that North Korean naval forces "sent to the bottom of the sea a spy ship of the U.S. imperialist aggressor army" which, under cover of "fighter planes and warships," had intruded "deep into the coastal waters" of the DPRK. The report charges that this episode followed recently "intensified" U.S. provocations along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and it cites an alleged firing incident of 3 June.

A more detailed account, carried by Pyongyang media on 7 and 8 June, gives the map coordinates of the alleged intrusion and a fuller description of the military engagement. The account charges that the infiltration was a "provocation planned beforehand by the U.S. imperialist aggressors" and refutes attempts by the "enemy" to "conceal the truth" about the episode by claiming that the ship was "kidnapped" by the North Koreans. The report says that, as the "enemy" himself announced, the ship was a 125-ton vessel equipped with 50-mm guns and with a crew of 20, and it asks rhetorically how such a ship could be led away by small North Korean patrol boats. The report does not acknowledge that the ship was ROK, continuing to imply that it was American.

A NODONG SINMUN commentary carried by KCNA on 6 June denounces the "reckless military provocations" of the U.S. imperialists which have become "all the more wanton of late," referring both to the sinking of the ship on the 5th and the DMZ incident of the 3d. The article repeats Pyongyang's stock accusation that the U.S. acts are part of a plan to "key up tension in Korea and kindle a new war." Reiterating that the situation in Korea today "has been strained to the extreme and the danger of a new war is daily growing," the commentary repeats that peace in Korea is maintained only by the patience of the North Koreans, and that "there is a limit to our patience." It quotes the warning by Kim Il-song at the time of the Pueblo incident--first made on Army Day, 8 February 1968, and frequently cited by propagandists--that "we do not want war, but are never afraid of it. Our people and the people's army will return retaliation for retaliation, all-out war for all-out war."

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In its routine report of the meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) on 9 June, at which the ship incident was among the items discussed, KCNA repeats Pyongyang's version of the sinking, as well as the usual warnings against further U.S. provocation.

PEKING COMMENT Peking supports the North Koreans with some high-level comment which seized upon the ship incident to press further Mao's 20 May call for a "united front" of Asian and world peoples against U.S. aggression throughout the world. Such PRC support may also be a function of the recent restoration of normal relations between the two countries after several years of coolness. The Chinese had supported the North Koreans with a PRC Government statement on the Pueblo incident, but Peking had either ignored or given only routine-level propaganda attention to subsequent incidents.

A 7 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article ties both the 3 June DMZ incident and the 5 June ship intrusion to broader U.S. aggression in Asia as a whole, asserting that the U.S. provocations against Korea are "by no means an isolated incident, but a component part of Nixon's plan to expand the war of aggression throughout Asia," having referred in this connection to the dispatch of U.S. troops to Cambodia. The article recalls that Mao's 20 May statement said that "the peoples in Asia and throughout the world, by further uniting themselves to help each other and fight together," will be able to defeat the U.S. aggressors. It concludes that China and Korea are "fraternal neighboring allies linked together by the same mountains and rivers" with a friendship "sealed in blood," and says that the Chinese people "firmly support" the Korean people in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and for the unification of their country.

The Korean incidents are also mentioned by Kang Sheng in a 9 June banquet speech for a Romanian delegation now in Peking after visiting the DPRK. Kang Sheng asserts that the Chinese people "resolutely condemn" the U.S. provocations and "firmly support" the Korean people, adding that the Korean experience in struggle shows that U.S. imperialism is "nothing to be afraid of" and that as long as one "dares to fight" it can be defeated. Like PEOPLE'S DAILY, Kang Sheng puts the current Korean incidents in the context of overall U.S. aggressive intent in Asia, mentioning them in conjunction with U.S. "aggression" in Indochina and the Mao statement's call for strengthening the "united front" of Asian people.

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On 9 June NCNA briefly reports that the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN acclaimed the North Korean sinking of the ship, saying that the Vietnamese people and army stand on the "same front" with the Korean people and army, and that the VPA regards the Korean exploit as its own.

MOSCOW            Moscow so far has given minimal, routine-level propaganda  
REACTION          attention to the current incidents. On 5 June TASS very  
                 briefly noted the KCNA report that North Korean naval  
forces sank an "American reconnaissance vessel in the DPRK's coastal  
waters." On the 9th, TASS carried a brief account of the MAC meeting.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW OPTIMISTIC ON WAR ANNIVERSARY, ATTACKS U.S. ON AID

Moscow marks the third anniversary of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war in a moderate volume of propaganda professing optimism about the changed "balance of forces" in the area.\* Commentators assert that Tel Aviv, hoping to turn its military victory of 1967 into a "political victory" in the Middle East, is "farther than ever from the realization of its goals." In the words of a 4 June TASS dispatch on the anniversary, the flames of guerrilla warfare in the occupied territories are rising still higher, and "the blows inflicted upon the invaders by the UAR armed forces are becoming ever more tangible."

A foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi on 9 June speaks of "a general qualitative change in the balance of power in the Middle East that is not in Israel's favor." Commentator Col. Dimitriyev, in a talk for Arab listeners on the 5th, noted the "steady change" in the balance, citing among other factors the "superiority" of Arab artillery allegedly evidenced in recent duels, the growing "heroism, steadfastness, and courage" of Arab fighters, and increased cohesion among the fedayeen. A lengthy dispatch by TASS commentator Primakov on the 6th draws attention to recent incursions across the Suez Canal by UAR army units which "delivered telling blows at the enemy" and to the recent failure of the Israeli air force to penetrate deeply and freely into the UAR. "Even Israeli sources estimate," Primakov says, that the Israeli armed forces lost more killed or wounded in May of 1970 than in any other month of the past three years.

Primakov routinely pledges continuing Soviet "support" for the Arabs in their struggle for liquidation of the aftermath of the Israeli "aggression." And at an earlier point in the dispatch he alludes to the presence of "Soviet military advisers," noting

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\* Moscow devotes over four percent of its broadcast comment in the week ending 7 June to the Middle East; of this four percent, one percent is devoted to the "Week of Solidarity With the Arab People." Middle East events occasioned some four percent of comment in the week ending 31 May, of which the 30 May TASS statement on Lebanon accounted for just under one percent. Moscow had treated the second anniversary of the Arab-Israeli war in three percent of its weekly comment (2-8 June 1969).

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Israeli Premier Meir's "provocative threat of a military collision" with them. In the domestic service commentators' roundtable show the following day, Primakov repeats his remarks on advisers and the Israeli "threat" against them.\* The 4 June TASS dispatch on the war anniversary says that "measures" taken by the UAR forced Israel late in April to stop deep bombing raids, and it adds that Nasir in a 28 May speech observed that these measures "were made possible because the Soviet Union supplied the UAR with the most up-to-date equipment." The 5 June Dimitriyev commentary says that Nasir has observed that the USSR "offered everything needed for repelling the aggressor and played a great part through its assistance in consolidating the Arab countries' defense capability."

U.S. AID      Moscow's propagandists sustain their attack on the role played by the United States in assisting the Israeli "aggressors," currently focusing on the pending Tel Aviv request for additional jet aircraft. They duly publicize the letter from 73 U.S. Senators--delivered to the State Department on 1 June--which urges the delivery of Phantoms and Skyhawks, alleging that the letter is in fact "a direct result of the pro-Israeli campaign mounting in the United States." Consistent with propaganda last month, when Israeli Foreign Minister Eban visited the United States, commentators conclude that there is little doubt that the request for the aircraft will be granted. A TASS dispatch on the 3d, for example, cites U.S. papers for the observation that both the White House and the State Department have welcomed the letter and that the Administration is waiting for the "appropriate moment" to begin delivery. A PRAVDA article the following day, reviewed by TASS, says that Senator Scott has stated "in public that the Administration is certain to comply with Tel Aviv's request." A broadcast for North American listeners on the 7th asserts that while the President has not yet declared publicly his intention to send Israel more Phantoms and Skyhawks, Secretary Rogers "has already informed his NATO colleagues that the decision has been fixed." TASS on 8 June, reporting Secretary Rogers' remarks on "Face The Nation" the previous day, says that

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\* A rare reference by Soviet media to Kosygin's 4 May press conference remarks on the presence of Soviet military advisers in the UAR appeared in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 6, signed to the press on 22 May. The article, by Kolesnichenko, briefly summarized his remarks, noting that they came in response to a question from a Swiss correspondent regarding Israeli charges that "Soviet pilots are making flights over the UAR."

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he indicated the Administration was considering the question of delivering to Israel "a new lot of warplanes." TASS says that this would "aggravate the situation in the Middle East, which is tense as it is." While the Secretary stressed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, TASS adds, "it can be seen from his answers that the United States, in reality, intends further to encourage and arm the Israeli aggressors, to support their provocative sorties against the Arab states."

Commentators put little stock in Premier Meir's statement in the Knesset that Israel is prepared to recognize the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution on the Middle East, viewing it as a ploy to gain Washington's sympathy at a time when the latter is considering the sale of jet aircraft. PRAVDA's Kudryavtsev, in an article on 31 May, says that she ignored the "main question," the withdrawal of Israeli troops. And Kudryavtsev goes on to charge that Mrs. Meir joined Eban in "an artless performance staged by Washington" which allegedly needed this "'peace-loving gesture' in order to attempt to reduce the international public's indignation in connection with the plans to send additional weapons to Israel." A domestic service commentary on 5 June says that there is nothing new in Mrs. Meir's statement, noting that Israel's UN ambassador as well as Eban have more than once declared their agreement with the November 1967 resolution. Charging that these peace-loving words do not jibe with Israel's deeds, the commentary concludes that Mrs. Meir's statement, "like the profuse talk about an alleged Soviet infiltration into the UAR to which she has had recourse, is completely and unambiguously addressed to Washington. Israel is striving to obtain approval from the White House for the delivery of a fresh batch of Phantoms."

PEACEFUL            Moscow continues routinely to urge a peaceful  
SETTLEMENT        settlement in the Middle East. A PRAVDA editorial  
                  article of 9 June on the anniversary of the Moscow  
conference of communist and workers parties observes that cooperation of the socialist states, primarily the USSR, with the peoples of the Arab countries has "risen to a new level," expanding the possibilities of struggle for a political settlement in the Middle East which would "take into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples." PRAVDA's Belyayev on the 8th says a "political settlement on the basis of the UN Security Council November resolution [is] the sole alternative" to war.

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The Soviet-French communique following Gromyko's 1-5 June visit to France says that both sides affirmed their conviction on the need for a rapid political settlement based on the 22 November 1967 resolution. An enduring and just peace, the communique declares, requires the "liberation by Israel of all the occupied territories" and the commitment of "all interested countries" to recognize the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each other. It goes on to state that the Big Four must play a substantial role in formulating such a settlement, and that these powers must double their efforts with the aim of reaching the most rapid agreement so that UN special representative Gunnar Jarring "can resume his mission."

In remarks in Paris on the 3d, reported by AFP, Gromyko said that in order to settle the Middle East problem, "we must first settle the problem of the withdrawal of Israeli forces," and that a new, long-term agreement must be concluded within the framework of the United Nations. He went on to state that Israel, like all other countries, has "the right" to exist as a sovereign nation.

Moscow briefly acknowledges the resumption of U.S.-Soviet talks on the Middle East, the domestic service reporting on the 3d that Secretary Rogers met with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington the previous day to discuss the matter of a peaceful settlement. Previously, Soviet commentators have touched in passing on the bilateral contacts, but Moscow has generally refrained from reporting specific meetings. TASS commentator Primakov, in his 6 June dispatch and in his remarks in the commentators' roundtable on the 7th, notes that the bilateral talks were recently resumed, adding that "some people in America would like to use these contacts as a political screen to camouflage their attempts to delay a political settlement of the Middle East conflict."

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## UNITED NATIONS

## PRC CONTINUES TO EXPRESS INTEREST IN UN SEAT "RESTORATION"

Twice recently high-level Chinese officials have again expressed appreciation for the support of third-world governments for "the restoration of China's legitimate rights" in the United Nations. Since June 1967, in speeches by Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, and Kuo Mo-jo at banquets and receptions for officials of such governments as Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Cambodia, and Pakistan, and in joint communiques with Zambia and Mauritania, Peking has appeared to maintain a less rigid stance on the UN membership question than it did prior to 1967, when it both disclaimed interest in joining the organization and threatened the creation of a "new and revolutionary UN" if the existing organization were not reformed.

The two recent Chinese utterances implying continued interest in UN membership were made in speeches by Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien at an Afghanistan Embassy independence day reception on 27 May and by PLA Air Force commander Wu Fa-hsien at a farewell banquet for the visiting Pakistani Air Force commander-in-chief on 3 June. Li expressed "thanks" to the Afghanistan Government for "consistently supporting the struggle for the restoration of the legitimate seat of the PRC in the United Nations," and Wu similarly expressed gratitude for Pakistan's opposition to "the creation of 'two Chinas'" and its support for "the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations."

Other recent statements to this effect were made by Kuo Mo-jo on 11 March at a PRC-Pakistan Friendship Association banquet in Karachi and on 23 March at a Pakistan Embassy reception in Peking in honor of Pakistan's National Day; and by Li Hsien-nien on 9 November 1969 at a Peking reception honoring Cambodia's National Day. Both expressed "thanks" to the respective governments for support for the "restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations," with Kuo Mo-jo on 11 March referring to "the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" and on 23 March to "the 'two Chinas' plot."

## BACKGROUND

The idea of establishing a revolutionary United Nations was first expounded on an authoritative level in a 24 January 1965 speech by Chou En-lai, shortly after Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations. It was endorsed

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in a September 1965 press conference by then foreign minister Chen I and was pressed periodically in Chinese media through 1966. The last reference by a leader to the establishment of a "new, revolutionary United Nations" was contained in a 24 June 1967 speech by Chou En-lai at a reception in Peking for visiting Zambian President Kaunda. Chinese leaders have not reiterated their disavowal of interest in UN membership since Chen I stated on 11 December 1966 that "China has no interest in becoming a member of a United Nations under U.S. and Soviet control." Since then these two themes have not reappeared at an authoritative level with a single exception: A 30 November 1967 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, in a defensive response to that year's UN vote on the PRC membership question, stated that "frankly speaking, the Chinese people are not at all interested in joining the United Nations" and suggested that if the "just demands" of the world peoples were not met by the existing organization they would have every right "to set up a new and revolutionary United Nations."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW PRESSES ATTACK AGAINST PEKING'S ASIAN POLICIES

The continuing barrage of Soviet polemical attacks on Peking has been highlighted by an article in NEW TIMES (No. 23, dated 4 June) warning against the pernicious effects of Chinese policies in south and southeast Asia. Though the themes of Chinese expansionism and adventurism in Asia became prominent in Soviet propaganda more than three years ago, the timing of the current article provides another sign of Moscow's concern over a growth of Chinese influence in that area. Moscow's effort to isolate Peking is also reflected in comment on the anniversary of last June's international party conference, which is portrayed--with considerable distortion--as a triumph of the Soviet line in the communist movement and a condemnation of the Chinese.

An explicit reference to trouble at the Sino-Soviet talks in Peking is contained in a speech by Premier Kosygin on 10 June, reflecting Soviet impatience over lack of progress at the talks as well as the tough line being taken toward the Chinese generally. Kosygin charged that the Chinese are following a line which has not been conducive to "any appreciable progress" either in the normalization of relations in general or in the Peking talks. Despite the "complexity" of the talks, which "are hampered through the fault of the Chinese side," he affirmed that Moscow intends to continue the negotiations.

In his press conference on Cambodia on 4 May Kosygin had stated that the talks were continuing and avoided casting any aspersions at the Chinese. The last previous elite remarks in which the Chinese were accused of impeding the talks were made by Brezhnev and Kirilenko in speeches on 14 April. But where they blamed Peking's war preparations campaign for fostering an unfavorable atmosphere for the talks, Kosygin's remarks may be construed as a reference to the position being taken by the Chinese at the talks themselves.

Moscow's vigorous polemical assault on the Chinese has not included charges of current border provocations or allusions to border tension. Peking continues to ignore the border question.

UKRAINTSEV ARTICLE  
IN NEW TIMES

The NEW TIMES article, attributed in broadcast versions to Mikhail Ukrainsev, follows up with specific charges the generalized attack on Peking's Asian policies contained in the authoritative PRAVDA editorial article on 18 May. In addition to charges of Chinese troublemaking in Asia that have been standard for several years, the article is notable

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for its claims that Chinese interference in Cambodia prompted rightwing elements to stage the coup against Sihanouk and that Peking's hegemonistic aims cause apprehension among "those people and organizations" in Asia that would like to cooperate with the PRC. The thrust of the PRAVDA editorial article had been directed at Peking's failure to accept united action with the Soviets, thus providing encouragement to imperialist intervention. The NEW TIMES article is designed to play on fears of Chinese expansionism to counter Peking's efforts to expand its influence in Indochina in particular and Asia in general.

Among examples of Chinese meddling in neighboring countries' affairs, NEW TIMES charges that insurgents in northern Burma "are supported" by Chinese infiltrated into the country. It also mentions past attempts to create a Peking-Djakarta axis and attributes failures of communist insurgent movements in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia to Peking's adventurist line. The article cites Laos as well as Cambodia as objects of Chinese designs--it pointedly recalls Sihanouk's past troubles with the Chinese--but Vietnam is mentioned only in a list of countries on which Peking allegedly lays claim.

Ukrainsev--sometimes identified as a professor--has been the attributed source of frequent radio commentaries in recent years dealing with these themes. One such commentary, broadcast in Mandarin to southeast Asia on 27 March 1967, contained passages virtually identical with several of those in the NEW TIMES article. This commentary also seemed to be the same as an article published in a weekly newsletter released by the Soviet embassy in Bangkok that year, according to an AP dispatch on 1 November 1967 which quoted an embassy spokesman as describing the author, Prof. M. Ukrainsev, as a top Soviet expert on China. An M. Ukrainsev--the signature used for the NEW TIMES article--signed an article appearing in PRAVDA on 8 December 1966 denouncing U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam.

The commentary broadcast in March 1967, like the NEW TIMES article, referred to distrust of Peking among countries in Asia. Though the timing of the current article suggests concern over opportunities for the Chinese to increase their leverage in Indochina, it is inconclusive whether the passage referring to apprehension among those wishing to cooperate with the PRC is addressed specifically to Hanoi and its Indochinese allies or, more generally, is part of Moscow's continuing effort to isolate and discredit Peking. Versions of the article have thus far been broadcast to south Asia in English, Burmese, Urdu, Hindi, and Bengali, and in Japanese and Romanian, among others. None has been monitored in broadcasts beamed to the Indochinese countries, a fact seemingly at odds with an interpretation of the passage in question as being directed in particular to Hanoi.

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OTHER SOVIET  
COMMENT

Wide-ranging attacks on Chinese policies have continued in the Soviet press in the wake of the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article. The anniversary of the June 1969 international party conference provided the occasion for Moscow to reassert its line of unity of action and to draw on the authority of the communist movement as a whole to condemn the Chinese as heretics and obstructionists. As to be expected, the Soviets have glossed over the refusal of parties such as the Romanian to join in the anti-Chinese chorus at the conference. Moscow's hard line is in evidence in a 9 June PRAVDA editorial article on the conference, which insists that there can be no concessions in the ideological conflict with Peking and inveighs against ideological neutrality in the communist movement--a warning that coincides with the arrival of a Romanian delegation in Peking.

A 5 June SOVIET RUSSIA article on the conference anniversary boasted that a number of parties (e.g. the North Vietnamese and North Korean) not represented at the conference had participated in the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow this April. The article took this fact as evidence that Peking is being increasingly isolated and claimed that Maoism is encountering a growing rebuff in the communist movement, including those parties whose leadership has been in the grip of "left revisionist, nationalist views." The article adds, rather cryptically, that "many facts testify to this," but it cites only a faction of the Indonesian communists as calling for struggle against Maoist influence.

## PEKING CONTINUES RESTRAINT, WELCOMES ROMANIAN DELEGATION

Moscow's persistent polemical forays have not brought responding fire from Peking, apart from an article in RED FLAG No. 6 reacting to Soviet taunts that the Chinese satellite launching was dependent on foreign assistance and a 4 June PEOPLE'S DAILY article--on Chinese shipbuilding--claiming that the Soviets along with the United States are pursuing a gunboat policy threatening China. Peking's last previous anti-Soviet attack, with the exception of a passing reference in the CCP's 22 May message on the Indonesian CP's anniversary, appeared in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on May Day singing praise for the earth satellite and mocking "Brezhnev and company" for predicting that China would find the going impossible unless it became a Soviet dependency. The RED FLAG article (broadcast to Overseas Chinese on 4 June), which insists that no foreign personnel or equipment played a part in the satellite design and manufacture, reflects Peking's current restraint in its use of such circumlocutions as "social imperialists" while avoiding direct attacks on the Soviets by name.

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Peking's general polemical abstinence encompasses a period which includes several natural targets of attack, such as the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty incorporating the Brezhnev doctrine, the PRAVDA editorial article on 18 May assailing the Chinese as "pseudorevolutionaries," and Moscow's failure to recognize Sihanouk's government-in-exile. This restraint accords with Peking's effort to emerge from isolation by wooing neutralist elements in the communist movement; the arrival of a high-level Romanian delegation on the 9th is the latest manifestation of this effort. A more flexible approach is in keeping with a significant trend, in Peking's portrayal of the international environment, away from a picture of Soviet-U.S. collaboration to contain, or "encircle," China and toward a more differentiated line. Thus, Peking's recent variations on the theme of Soviet-U.S. "collusion and contention" have been weighted toward elements of conflict between its two big adversaries and have generally avoided charges of collusion.

Peking has used the visit of the Romanian delegation headed by Emil Bodnaras, a Politburo-level leader, to play up the warmth of Sino-Romanian relations and to give a boost to Bucharest's determination to maintain its independence against Soviet pressure. The delegation is billed as representing the Romanian Grand National Assembly and State Council. NCNA's announcement on the delegation's arrival, as in earlier Romanian announcements of the visit, said it was invited by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, thus indicating a state rather than a party visit. Curiously, however, an NCNA report on a banquet honoring the delegation, also on the 9th, quoted Kang Sheng as saying the delegation's visit was at the invitation of the CCP as well as the NPC. This suggests that the Chinese decided to upgrade the visit.\*

Kang Sheng's admiring speech, while avoiding direct mention of the Soviets, took a crack at Moscow's doctrine of limited sovereignty in praising the Romanians for maintaining their independence and resisting foreign interference. As in earlier Chinese reports on the Romanian floods, Kang singled out "Comrade

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\* Kang Sheng, serving as host for the visit, qualifies for both state and party functions, being a vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and the Politburo member who handles interparty relations.

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Ceausescu" for his personal efforts in fighting the disaster. In a bitter dig at the Soviets, he denounced "those who gloat" over other's misfortunes and who attempt to force the Romanians to succumb by taking advantage of their troubles.

Peking has also used the proxy of its foreign allies to conduct its ideological rivalry with Moscow. NCNA on 5 June quoted Albanian party chief Hoxha as denouncing the Soviets for attempting to subjugate their allies and for preparing for war against China. Hoxha was also quoted as claiming that the Chinese satellite launching was a blow to the Soviet-U.S. "monopoly of strategic weapons"--an appraisal of the strategic implications of the event which goes beyond any claim made by Peking in its own name.

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## ROMANIA

## BUCHAREST DEFENDS RIGHT TO PURSUE INDEPENDENT POLICIES

Against the background of the presence in Peking of a Romanian delegation led by Bodnaras,\* and a PRAVDA editorial article on the 9th warning against ideological neutrality, an article in SCINTEIA on the 10th over the authoritative signature of Iliescu defends Bucharest's right to pursue independent party relations. The SCINTEIA article--pegged, like the PRAVDA editorial article, to the first anniversary of the Moscow international party conference--reaffirms the Romanian view that the conference contained some "negative aspects." As reviewed by AGERPRES, SCINTEIA pointedly recalls that among the meeting's "positive" contributions was the fact that the conference main document included the principle that each party has the right "to decide its own domestic and foreign policy." SCINTEIA also assesses as positive the fact that the main document affirmed that "there is no leading center in the communist movement" and that it did not criticize or condemn any fraternal party.

In effect defending the RCP's neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the article goes on to point out that the party's 10th congress gave the present leadership "a mandate" not to engage in condemnations of other parties and called for the resolution of differences through discussions. The RCP, Iliescu underlines, "considered and considers that the bilateral and multilateral meetings and exchanges of opinions between the parties play an important role in the advancement of solidarity, of the unity of the communist movement."

"COOPERATION" As in the past, Romanian expressions of defiance  
WITH MOSCOW and independence have been accompanied in the  
press by expressions of Romanian willingness to  
cooperate with the Soviet Union. Thus a lengthy article in  
SCINTEIA on 7 June hails the "positive and continuously growing  
economic cooperation and collaboration with the Soviet Union."  
It goes on to cite past and recent agreements as "testimony to  
the ample scope, the fruitfulness, and the prospects of this  
cooperation based on mutual advantage and being in complete harmony  
with the interests of both peoples." Although such statements  
may be read as reassurance to the Romanian people following the

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\* For a discussion of the Bodnaras visit to Peking, see the Sino-Soviet section of this issue of the TRENDS.

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recent unheralded visits to Moscow by Ceausescu and Maurer, they also appear to be responsive to charges that Bucharest is not living up to its CEMA obligations. According to a Radio Belgrade report on 23 May, the Polish economic journal ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, taking note of Romania's refusal to join the CEMA investment bank, charged that Bucharest is "not cooperating in some other CEMA projects."

REACTION TO FLOODS Romanian media have used the disastrous floods that have inundated large portions of the country to portray a united people capable of winning any "battle" and repelling any enemy that would dare impinge on their independence. An article in SCINTEIA on 5 June, although defensively acknowledging that "nobody wishes misfortunes by which to reach moral conclusions," goes on to observe that the Romanian people reacted to the floods "as a unified nation, sharing a system of common values, animated by ideas which bind it, and living on a common territory." This unity, it adds, is a result "of the party's policy by which a powerful brotherhood of the entire people has been achieved in work and ideals."

Another SCINTEIA article on the 6th views the floods as a successful test of "the maneuver capacity" of the Romanian armed forces. It points out that the army reacted quickly and "worked faultlessly." Drawing a lesson from the events for unnamed foreign observers, the article adds pointedly: "The waves came up against--just as any enemy who would dare to attack our peaceful work would come up against--the strength of a people determined to defend itself."

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## CUBA - PERU

## CUBAN DISASTER AID LINKED TO INTEREST IN RENEWED TIES

Aside from whatever humanitarian motives may underly the dispatch of Cuban medical aid to Peru in the aftermath of the disastrous earthquake, it appears likely that Havana's extensive publicity for the aid effort is related to its interest in promoting relations with the Lima regime. The Cuban aid effort began on 4 June when two Cuban planes--with Cuban Public Health Minister Heliodoro Martinez Junco aboard the first plane--arrived in Lima carrying blood plasma. On the same day the Cuban party organ GRANMA carried a frontpage appeal for blood donations "to help the Peruvians," noting that the medical aid constituted "a basic duty of solidarity toward the Peruvian people whose revolutionary movement has awakened the interest and sympathy of our populace." Havana radio's report on the appeal goes on to underscore Cuban-Peruvian revolutionary affinity by noting that "every nation makes its own revolution but among revolutionary peoples there is an inexorable intermingling of sentiment."

Castro and Cuban President Dorticos' personal participation in the aid campaign provided a further indication of the political importance which Havana ascribes to the program. Havana media on the 4th reported that both donated blood to help the Peruvians, and quoted Castro as stating that "the contribution of blood to Peru is very important--a service that often cannot be resolved with money because this happened to us when we had to import plasma." On 9 June Radio Havana reported the departure of a Cuban medical team for Lima--"the first Cuban unit of this type to take part in medical work in a Latin American nation"--and noted that Castro and Dorticos briefed the team at the airport, spending an hour and a half with them before seeing them off. Havana on the 10th quoted Castro as having said at the airport that "this is the first group to go to Peru," and that Cuba is willing "to send more personnel, as many as necessary; we imagine that we will have a limit, but we can manage."

Arriving in Peru the Cuban health minister was quoted by ANSA as promising that Cuba would "offer all possible help" and indicating that if necessary "sacrifices" would be made to provide assistance. A frontpage headline in GRANMA on the 9th announced that Cubans were continuing to donate blood for Peru for the fifth consecutive day.

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The Cubans have not concealed their interest in Peruvian reaction to their assistance; Radio Havana on the 8th reported Cuban Health Minister Martinez Junco as saying in Lima that Peruvians he spoke with "seem to be happy in knowing we are here with them . . . [and] show their appreciation and thank us for the modest but solicitous assistance of the Cuban people." PRENSA LATINA's Lima correspondent in information dispatches to Havana has highlighted positive Peruvian reaction to Cuba's aid contribution. A dispatch on the 5th reported that the Director of Peru's Presidential Information Office lauded Cuban aid as probably the most important of recent contributions from foreign countries and as representing genuine revolutionary sentiment.

**BACKGROUND** For more than a year Havana had broadly hinted at its interest in renewing relations with the Lima government. In his most recent statement on the matter, Castro in his 22 April Lenin Day speech praised the Peruvian military for pursuing "a plan for the country's growth" and said that if it is followed consistently it must "lead to a revolution." Castro also appeared to have Peru primarily in mind when he declared that Havana's support for revolution did not signify backing for guerrilla movements exclusively, but also encompassed "any government that sincerely adopts a policy of economic and social growth and is for liberating the country from the Yankee imperialist yoke." Castro concluded that "regardless of how this government came to power, Cuba will support it."\* During the speech, Castro recalled that he had previously spelled out his position on Peru in a 14 July speech last year. In that speech he had revealed for the first time his interest in renewing relations with Peru, praising the "revolutionary character" of the actions of the Peruvian Government, and noting that while he would not "beg the Peruvian leaders" for diplomatic relations, he would not refuse such relations if they proved themselves "really and consistently revolutionary."

The first indication of Cuban interest in renewed ties came in April 1969 when Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, attending a Lima conference of the Economic Commission for Latin America, praised Peru's expropriation of International Petroleum Company assets, offered Cuba's backing for Peru in the face of U.S. "pressure and blackmail," and intimated that the Lima regime met Havana's prerequisite for reestablishing relations in following policies "independent" of the United States.

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\* For further discussion of Castro's 22 April statements on the question of renewing relations with Latin American nations, see the FBIS TRENDS of 29 April 1970, pages 37-38.

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Havana's interest in establishing economic links with Peru was revealed in a statement in April ~~this~~ year by Cuban CP Central Committee member and National Fishing Institute Director Capt. Emilio Aragonés Navarro, in Lima to attend an international fishing congress. Radio Havana reported that Aragonés met with the Peruvian fishery minister and "discussed the possibility of exchanging technical assistance in the fishing industry." Aragonés, in a Lima statement reported by ANSA on 17 April but not by Havana media, was quoted as saying that Cuba "is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any American country."

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## SOVIET KOMSOMOL

## EX-FIRST SECRETARY'S APPOINTEES CLEANED OUT BY CONGRESS

The 16th All-Union Komsomol Congress, 26-30 May, resulted in extensive changes in the Komsomol leadership. These changes mark the final step in removing the appointees of the former first secretary, S. P. Pavlov, and establishing the control of the new first secretary, Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov.

While turnover of office holders is always relatively heavy in the Komsomol, the extent of the renewal over the past two years amounts to a nearly total shift in political control. The new nine-man Secretariat elected on 30 May includes only two holdovers from Pavlov's tenure: B. N. Pastukhov, second secretary, and T. A. Kutsenko, chairman of the young pioneers. Secretaries A. I. Kamshalov, V. T. Duvakin, and A. Kh. Vezirov were dropped at the congress and transferred to party work (Vezirov was identified in the 27 May KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as first secretary of the Kirovabad city party committee in Azerbaydzhan). Secretary Yu. V. Torsuyev was dropped in February 1970 and secretary A. Yu. Chesnavichus in December 1969 (he was identified as head of a Lithuanian Central Committee section in the 20 January 1970 RED STAR). Pavlov and another secretary, M. I. Zhuravleva, had been dropped in June 1968 to become chairman of the council of sports societies and deputy minister of education, respectively.

Nine new bureau members were elected at the conclusion of the congress, in addition to four others elected since Tyazhelnikov took over. Only Pastukhov, Kutsenko, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor B. D. Pankin, Leningrad first secretary R. V. Nikolayev, and secretary G. P. Yeliseyev are holdovers in the 19-member bureau.

Almost all Central Committee section chiefs have been replaced since Pavlov's fall in mid-1968, as well as first secretaries of half of the 14 union republic central committees and first secretaries of the overwhelming majority of provincial organizations. The turnover of Central Committee members was considerable, with the new 209-member committee containing only 36 holdovers from the 1966 congress, although this is not in itself extraordinary: the 1966 Central Committee contained only 34 holdovers among its 173 members.

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PAVLOV        The Tyazhelnikov leadership demonstrated that it did not  
 SNUBBED       want Pavlov around in any capacity, even though his present  
                  position as chairman of the state committee for physical  
 culture and sports involves working closely with the Komsomol leader-  
 ship. Pavlov's deputy, A. I. Kolesov, was elected a member of the  
 Komsomol bureau instead of Pavlov. Pavlov was not reelected to the  
 Central Committee and was not present at the congress. Another of  
 his deputies, V. A. Ivonin, delivered the lead speech at the congress'  
 section on "The Komsomol, Physical Culture and Sports" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
 PRAVDA, 30 May).

There can be little doubt that the chairman of the committee is  
 normally entitled to membership in the bureau. Pavlov's predecessor  
 was a member of the bureau that was elected at the 1966 congress,  
 when the sports organization was still part of the Komsomol. After  
 Pavlov became chairman in 1968, the sports organization was changed  
 to a state committee, but it still is represented in the bureau.  
 While Pavlov's deputy represents the committee in the All-Union  
 Komsomol Bureau, the Ukrainian sports committee is represented in  
 the Ukrainian Komsomol bureau by its chairman.

It is also possible that this snub foreshadows Pavlov's removal as  
 sports director--especially in view of the continually declining  
 fortunes of those associated with Shelepin (such as N. N. Mesyatsev,  
 removed as Radio-Television Committee chairman in April). Pavlov  
 was last identified as sports committee chairman on 4 April when he  
 wrote a PRAVDA article on Moscow's bid for the 1976 Olympics.

ISSUES        Few issues were raised at the congress. There was no  
 NEGLECTED    great stress even on ideological conformity. The  
                  strongest warning to students and young scientists  
 was Tyazhelnikov's declaration that "without deep study of Marxist-  
 Leninist theory and without a clear understanding of the policy of  
 the party and state one cannot be a good Soviet specialist"  
 (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 May). Little was said about literature,  
 and there were no attacks on literary works. Moldavian first  
 secretary P. K. Luchinskiy was the only speaker to complain about  
 the ideological orientation of "some young writers" and about films  
 whose heroes philosophize instead of acting decisively (KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
 PRAVDA, 29 May). The meeting of the section on esthetic education  
 also apparently heard no complaints of ideological shortcomings  
 (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 May).

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Soviet liberals can hardly have been reassured, however, by the fact that the only representative of the literary world (except for editors of Komsomol publications) included in the new Komsomol leadership was young Stalinist poet Feliks Chuyev, elected to the congress editorial commission and also named a candidate member of the new Central Committee. Chuyev's Stalinist views are so extreme that he has at times been in trouble with the authorities.

The subject of mechanized links, previously pressed so ardently by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and by Komsomol secretary Duvakin, was raised at the congress but with a minimum of fanfare. Tyazhelnikov mentioned it only in passing ("Komsomol organizations are participating in the introduction of progressive forms of organization and pay of labor and in creating unregulated mechanized links and brigades"). Only two other congress speakers cited the links. Tractor driver V. T. Sleptsova praised Tyazhelnikov's brief mention ("The Komsomol Central Committee report correctly spoke about unregulated mechanized links") and called upon "the Komsomol Central Committee to show more activity" in propagating links (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 May). KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor Pankin, an ardent link champion, claimed that part of the credit for winning acceptance for the unregulated pay system belongs to the youth press (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 May). The congress section on agriculture, conducted by retiring agriculture secretary Duvakin, included the "broad application" of unregulated links in its recommendations (ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 23). The congress resolution, however, failed to mention the links (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 31 May).

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## CITY COMMITTEES FOR CCP AND YCL ANNOUNCED IN HEILUNGKIANG

On 8 June Harbin radio reported the formation of a municipal committee of the Young Communist League (YCL) for Shuangyashan, a major city in Heilungkiang. The committee was said to be the first established at the municipal level in Heilungkiang since the cultural revolution began. In fact, although rebuilding of the YCL was ordered in last year's 1 July joint editorial from Peking, this is the first report on re-establishment of a YCL committee at this level in the nation. And Heilungkiang has also claimed the only rebuilt county-level YCL committee (reported by Harbin radio on 5 April) in the country. Efforts elsewhere to rebuild the YCL have produced meager results; only Nanking has claimed success in forming a new YCL unit and that only a branch for a local production brigade.

The 8 June Harbin report also indicated that a representative of the CCP Shuangyashan municipal committee, as well as representatives of the CCP Heilungkiang Provincial Core Group and the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, attended the YCL congress, held from 22-26 May, which elected the new YCL municipal committee. Heilungkiang is the second province to announce a rebuilt municipal committee; Kwangtung formed the first city committee reported in the nation on 1 February. Neither the Shuangyashan YCL committee nor the CCP committee for Shuangyashan have yet been publicized by central media.

While the campaign to rebuild the party appears to be making some progress in Heilungkiang, it continues to be slowed to a near standstill by nagging problems in other areas and by Peking's unreadiness to publicize and promote new party committees above the basic level. Peking's unwillingness to publicize rebuilt party committees above the basic level was again exposed in a 2 June NCNA report on industrial advances in Maoming, Kwangtung, the first city in the country to claim a rebuilt party committee. The NCNA report did not mention the city committee there, originally announced by Canton radio on 1 February, but noted only in passing a low-level party committee in a Maoming factory. NCNA then specifically praised the "city revolutionary committee" for its work in industrial coordination in Maoming. In contrast to the 2 June NCNA report, Canton radio, also on 2 June, reported on the same coordination campaign in Maoming but

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unlike NCNA applauded the leadership of the "Maoming municipal CCP committee" in scoring local industrial advances and did not mention the municipal revolutionary committee.

A 19 May Radio Peking broadcast of an article on strengthening party leadership by a member of the model party committee of the Shanghai No. 17 cotton mill took careful aim at clarifying again "the question of how to correctly handle the relationship between the party committee and the revolutionary committee." Although the supremacy of rebuilt party committees over revolutionary committees has been unequivocally stated in the central press, the issue apparently continues to be subject to local misunderstandings. The article condemned the fact that some members "of our party committee and the revolutionary committee often held different views toward some questions and even indulged in some erroneous thinking." To achieve stronger party leadership, while "at the same time" giving "play to the role of the revolutionary committee," the party committee must make decisions on major questions and the revolutionary committee must "accept the party committee's leadership in exercising power and carrying out its work."

#### PEKING ADMITS DEFICIENCIES IN RAW MATERIALS, ESPECIALLY FUELS

An article by the writing group of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee carried by Peking radio on 3 June makes the highly unusual admission that the production of raw materials "does not correspond with the new needs of the rapidly developing national economy; . . . a comparatively large gap exists, particularly in the coal and iron and steel industries." Citing the development of local small coal mines in Kwangtung this year as the correct way to resolve the dilemma, the article cautions residents of the province that Kwangtung "is part of" the country; its products must be used to "insure the achievement of major construction projects throughout the country" while Kwangtung itself "requests as little as possible of the materials which we need from the rest of the country."

The article brings together two themes appearing with increasing frequency in PRC media this past spring. On the one hand there have been numerous injunctions, especially from Shanghai, to "treat the whole country as a coordinated chess game" on the economic front: each province must be willing to sacrifice for others and local industries must not consume materials destined

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for large plants which are part of the state plan. While the idea of sacrifice has been most stressed in recent broadcasts, the latter problem has been brought to the forefront again in a RED FLAG article released by NCNA on 8 June which warns that "ways must be found" to prevent the raw materials and equipment set aside for the national plan from being used by local plants at will. The article warns local plants that might desire to expand that "due to the limitation of funds, resources, technique, equipment, and other conditions, it is impossible to develop fairly large local industries in large numbers."

The other current major economic theme has been to stress the local development of raw materials, especially coal. An article by the Honan revolutionary committee writing group given extensive national coverage in early June noted that 10 small coal mines are already open in the province with production equal to that of two large mines, but at a third of the cost and having taken half the time to open. Most provinces in east and central China have reported similar experiences. Hupeh radio on 5 June claimed that after only six months of hard work the Hsiangyang Special District had achieved self-sufficiency in coal and that a "campaign to discover further coal deposits has been launched." Canton on 6 June noted that "41 percent of Kwangtung's total coal production" is produced by small coal mines and that many counties have ceased reliance on state aid. Such efforts are often linked in the media with steel production, as in an NCNA account on 3 June which told of a Kiangsi county that had developed its coal and iron mines and has now built a steel-making furnace.

While the current shortages of raw materials may be caused by increased industrial capacities and output, it seems likely that part of the problem results from lack of central coordination at a period when PRC media have strongly advocated expansion of local industries to aid local agriculture. The PRC leadership has seemed to indicate some awareness of that this might happen--it was a major problem during the great leap period--but apparently local enthusiasm for using local materials has again outrun limited central planning abilities.

#### RED FLAG REBUTS COMPLAINTS OVER SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURE

An article in RED FLAG No. 6, released by NCNA on 3 June, replies in a relatively frank manner to critics of the doctrine that industry's prime purpose at this stage of development is to support agriculture. The two main charges against the current

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program are said to be: (1) turning out "simple and crude" agricultural machinery offers no prospect for the technical development of Chinese industry, and (2) there is little profit for industry because "the prices are kept low."

The first charge is refuted with the argument that support to agriculture has "laid a good foundation for socialist industry" and the reminder that only when there is a bumper harvest can "we live a better life and our industrial development proceed more rapidly." On the second charge, the article admits that industrial profits have been kept at a low level as part of the effort to minimize differences between the city and the country. The policy of "reducing profit to increase sales" is said to be necessary even after years of "bumper harvests" in order to "protect the socialist productive initiative of the peasant masses."

Eschewing the usual theme of pure political motivation through Mao's thought, the article says it is "imperative" to maintain a correct industrial price policy and raise the peasants' incomes "year by year" in order to "promote the use of new techniques, new pesticides, and new machines in agriculture." If new products were sold for normal profits, "the result would be a reduction in sales, which would handicap the development of agriculture and industry." Those who continue to oppose this concentration of economic effort on supporting agriculture are warned that it is a "bourgeois attitude" to regard the relationship between industry and agriculture as a matter of "one loses while the other gains."

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